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This paper presents a stress indicator for the Euro-zone that summarizes developments of 
trends and cycles in real GDP and inflation in the member countries. Stress in a country is 
defined as the difference between the country’s actual short-term interest rate and the interest 
rate that would prevail if that country was able to follow an “optimal” monetary policy. The 
optimal monetary policy rule corresponds to the policy rule that was adopted by the country 
in the pre-EMU period and depends on the trend growth rates of GDP and consumer prices as 
well as on the related cyclical components. The main results are that stress in the Euro-zone is 
mainly due to different trend growth rates and that for most of the Euro-zone countries 
interest rates have been too low over the 1999-2005 period. Stress in Germany is close to 
zero, implying that the ECB continues the policy of the Bundesbank. 
JEL Code: E31, E32, E58. 






Ifo Institute for Economic Research at 






Ifo Institute for Economic Research at 








February 13, 2007 
We thank Wolfgang Franz, Manfred Stadler, Jan-Egbert Sturm and the other participants of 
the 36. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren for helpful comments and 
discussions. 1  Introduction 
In a recent article, Charles Wyplosz (2006) argued forcefully that the foundation of the European 
monetary union (EMU) happened more for political reasons than because of a strong belief that 
the potential European member countries constitute an optimum currency area. A monetary 
union entails advantages and disadvantages for the individual member countries. A monetary 
union lowers transaction costs in international trade and eliminates part of the exchange rate 
uncertainty. On the other side, each country looses the ability to conduct an independent 
monetary and exchange rate policy for smoothing business cycles and facilitating necessary 
changes of relative prices. Weighting the positive and negative aspects one can conclude that the 
benefits of a monetary union will dominate if the international mobility of labor as well as wage 
and price flexibility are high, if inflation rates are similar and national business cycles are highly 
correlated. 
 
In the nineties of the last century there appeared a great number of studies which argued that the 
member states of the planned European monetary union do not form an optimum currency area: 
Real wages were rigid and the mobility of labor low, shocks were asymmetrically distributed 
among countries, inflation rates very different and the correlation between the national business 
cycles rather low. Paul Krugman (1993) pointed out that a monetary union will lead to higher 
specialization which implies that sector specific shocks will imply less synchronized national 
business cycles. The opposite suggestion was launched by Frankel and Rose (1998). They argued 
that the criteria for an optimum currency area are endogenous and that a monetary union will 
intensify international trade and synchronize economic activities. Countries could constitute an 
optimal currency area after launching a monetary union even if they do not ex ante.  
 
At the time of the creation of the European monetary union the skeptical views dominated 
among economists. A prominent example was Martin Feldstein (1997) who expected that EMU 
will perpetuate structural unemployment and will raise the inflation rate as well as the likelihood 
of intra-European conflicts and protectionism.  
 
Empirical studies in recent years showed that such horror scenarios not happened in reality. In 
the empirical literature there seems to emerge a consensus that the co-movements of real and 
 1 nominal variables are relatively high in the Euro-zone and that cyclical asymmetries are 
relatively small among the member states (see for example Benalal et al., 2006, and Giannone 
and Reichlin, 2006). Nevertheless, from time to time we see a heated debate in the policy area 
concerning a potentially increasing divergence process. 
 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to analyze the development of the dispersion of 
real GDP and consumer price inflation across the Euro-zone countries from 1970 to 2005. For 
both variables we decompose the observed time series into a trend and a cycle component. In 
contrast to other studies we do not use a single method for this decomposition but apply different 
approaches in order to minimize statistical distortions. We then develop a stress indicator for the 
Euro-zone. According to Clarida et al. (1998) stress in a particular member country is defined as 
the difference between the country’s actual short-term interest rate and the interest rate that 
would prevail if that country was able to follow an “optimal” monetary policy. The optimal 
monetary policy rule corresponds to the policy rule that was adopted by the country in the pre-
EMU period. Aggregate stress in the Euro-zone is computed as a weighted average of country-
specific stresses. This summary measure depends on the trend growth rates of GDP and 
consumer prices of each member country as well as on the related cyclical components. The 
proposed stress indicator can serve as a useful measure of relevant divergence tendencies in the 
EMU. 
 
The main result of our analysis is that stress in the Euro-zone is mainly due to different trend 
growth rates of GDP and consumer prices. For most of the Euro-zone countries interest rates 
have been too low over the 1999-2005 period and would, on average, be higher by one or – 
depending on the construction of the stress indicator – two percentage points, if the countries 
were able to continue following the optimal policy rule they adopted in the pre-EMU period. By 
contrast, cyclical dispersion is rather low and the related stress is only minor in relation to the 
trend component of stress. An important finding of the analysis is that stress in Germany is close 
to zero all over the 1999-2005 period, implying that the ECB continues the policy of the German 
Bundesbank. 
 
 2 The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we decompose real GDP and consumer prices 
into a trend and a cycle component and look at traditional measures of dispersion across 
countries. In Section 3 we develop the stress indicator for the Euro-zone. Section 4 summarizes 
the main results and concludes. 
 
2  Trends and cycles in real GDP and consumer price inflation 
2.1  Determination of trends and cycles 
Extracting the trend and cycle component from an observed time series is not a trivial task. There 
exist a number of filters with different “philosophies” and assumptions for accomplishing this 
decomposition. This is a serious practical problem as the estimated cycles differ sometimes 
dramatically between different approaches (see for example Canova, 1998).  
 
The most popular approaches used in the literature are the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1997), the Baxter-King filter (Baxter and King, 1999), the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter 
(Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1999) and the Rotemberg filter (Rotemberg, 1999). In some sense all 
these methods are ad-hoc filters, as their implementation is not based on the characteristics of the 
time series under consideration. For this reason, we estimate an Unobserved Components model, 
which delivers a model-based filter that is consistent with the data (for a discussion see Harvey 
and Trimbur, 2003). 
 
The most used filter for decomposing a time series into trend and cycle is the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. The trend is determined by the requirements that it should be not too far away from the 
actual time series and that it should show a smooth behavior, measured by the squared change of 
the trend growth rate. The relative weight of the second requirement is determined by a 
smoothing parameter, which is to be determined a-priori and is set to the standard value of 1600. 
The cycle is constructed by subtracting the estimated trend from the observed series. The Baxter-
King and Christiano-Fitzgerald filters for extracting the cycle are band-pass filters. They are 
based on the idea that the business cycle is defined by a sharp range of frequencies which 
corresponds typically to a periodicity in the range of 6 to 32 quarters. This “ideal” filter is 
approximated in the Baxter-King approach by a symmetric moving average with a finite lead/lag 
 3 length (in this paper: 8 quarters). The Christiano-Fitzgerald filter is asymmetric and uses all 
observations for estimating the cyclical component. For both the Baxter-King and the Christiano-
Fitzgerald filters the trend component is constructed by subtracting the high-frequency 
component (periodicity between 2 and 32 quarter) from the original time series. The Rotemberg 
filter is based on the basic assumption of a “very smooth” trend. This idea is implemented by the 
requirement that the covariance between the cycle in period t and period   be as small as 
possible, provided that the change in the trend growth rates over some horizon (lead/lag of 5 
quarters) is uncorrelated with the cycle in t. In order to mitigate the end point problem we use 
the forecasts of the OECD for 2006 and 2007 in the Economic Outlook (June 2006).  
16 t +
 
In the Unobserved Components model the log of the observed time series  t x  is specified as the 
sum of a trend, a cycle and an irregular component:  
  ttt t x TCI = ++ . (1) 
The trend component   represents the long-run development of the series and is specified as a 
random walk with a possibly time-varying drift rate 
t T
t μ : 
  11 tt t TT t μ ε −− = ++ . (2) 
The level impulse  t ε  is a white noise variable with mean zero and variance 
2
ε σ . The drift rate  t μ  
is allowed to vary over time and is also defined as a random walk: 
  1 tt t μ μ − ξ = + . (3) 
The drift impulse  t ξ  is a white noise variable with variance 
2
ξ σ . The model specified in 
equations (2) and (3) implies that the trend component follows an  -process. Special 
cases emerge when we set the variance of the shocks to zero. If both are zero, we get a 
deterministic linear trend. If   is zero and   is strictly positive, the model collapses to a 
random walk with a constant drift rate. The opposite case with a strictly positive   and   
equal to zero gives an integrated random walk with a usually smooth trend component. This is 
the specification we use in the following. 










 4 The  cycle   captures the business cycle fluctuations around the trend component and is 
modeled as the sum of 
t C








= t i ∑ . (4) 
The specification of the total cycle as the superposition of subcycles with different frequencies is 
able to represent some ideas of classical business cycle theory (e.g., the existence of Kitchin or 
Juglar cycles) and to capture several forms of business cycle asymmetries (for some alternative 
specifications see Harvey and Trimbur, 2003). 
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∗ C  appears only by the construction of the recursion and has no intrinsic interpretation. The 
period of subcycle i is 2/
C
i π λ  with   the frequency in radians. The damping factor 
C
i λ i ρ  with 
1 0 ≤ < i ρ  ensures that   is a stationary  i t C , ( ) 2,1 ARMA  process with complex roots in the  AR -
part (see Harvey, 1989). This guarantees a quasi-cyclical behavior of  . The shocks  i t C , i t, κ and 
are assumed to be uncorrelated white noise variables with common variance  . They 







() 2, 2 1 ARMA M M −  process with restricted MA-parameters. Some pre-testing revealed 
that a model with  2 M =  subcycles delivers a good representation of most of the time series 
analyzed in the following. 
 
The irregular  t I  is specified as a white noise process.  
 
2.2  The data 
Most of the data has been taken from the Economic Outlook Database of the OECD, Volume 
2006 release 01. It is quarterly, covers the period 1970 Q1 – 2007 Q4, and includes the forecasts 
published in the OECD Economic Outlook June 2006. Real GDP,  , is measured by the series  t Y
 5  6 
t P
ln tt
“Gross Domestic Product (Market prices), Volume”, which is converted into euros for the pre-
1999 period. For Austria no quarterly data was available in the Economic Outlook Database, 
Volume 2006 release 01. Thus, we linked three different time series: For the period 1970 Q1 – 
1987 Q4 we used quarterly data published in the Economic Outlook Database, Volume 2005 
release 01; for the period 1988 Q1 – 2005 Q4 quarterly data was taken from the OECD Main 
Economic Indicators Database; for the period 2006 Q1 – 2007 Q4 we finally used the annual 
forecast for 2006 (2.5%) and 2007 (2.2%) as published in the OECD Economic Outlook June 
2006 and distributed these growth rates over quarters under the assumption of constant quarter-
on-quarter growth rates. German data was linked to Western German data before 1991. For the 
period 1970 Q1 – 1990 Q4 real GDP was taken from the Economic Outlook Database, Volume 
2005 release 01, and multiplied by a factor 1.13 (which is the average of 1991 Q1-Q4 unified 
Germany divided by average of 1991 Q1-Q4 Western Germany). 
 
The consumer price index,  , is measured by the series “Consumer Price Index, harmonized”. 
For some countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) there is no 
data available in the Economic Outlook Database, Volume 2006 release 01, before 1991. Again 
we took the missing data (1970 Q1 – 1990 Q4) from the Economic Outlook Database, Volume 
2005 release 01. 
 
2.3  Results 
For all five detrending approaches the analyzed time series are the log of real GDP,  y Y = , 
and the log of the consumer price index,  ln tt p P = . The trends of both variables are denoted by 
t y  and  t p . The trend growth rate of real GDP is given by  4
Y
tt t gy y − =− , and the GDP cycle is 
measured by the output gap, which is calculated as  ˆtt t y yy = − . The trend inflation rate is given 
by  4 tt t p p π − =− ; the cyclical inflation rate is simply the residual between headline inflation and 
trend inflation,  ˆtt t π ππ =−. In order to get a single measure of the trend and cycle in GDP and 
prices for each country we calculated the unweighted median of all methods. Figure 1 shows the 
detailed results for German GDP (top panel) and the medians of all approaches (bottom panel). 
The medians of the output gaps for all countries are displayed in Figure 2, the medians of all 
trend growth rates in Figure 3. Figure 4 to Figure 6 show the corresponding results for consumer 
prices. Figure 1: Output gaps (left panel) and trend growth rates (right panel), Germany 














































  7Figure 2: Median output gaps ( )  , ˆit y





































































  8Figure 3: Median trend growth rates (
Y
t g ) 















































































  9Figure 4: Cyclical inflation rates (left panel) and trend inflation rates (right panel), Germany 










































  10Figure 5: Median cyclical inflation rate ( , ˆ it π ) 










































































































































Figure 6: Median trend inflation rate ( , it π ) 2.4  Dispersion of trends and cycles 
A popular measure of convergence is the dispersion of trend growth rates and cycles (see for 
example ECB, 2003, and Benalal et al., 2006). In its most simple version it is given by the 
standard deviation of the variable under consideration, x, at time t. If the countries’ economic 
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where   is the weight for the 
th country,   is the number of countries, and  , it w i N
avgw
t x  is the 
weighted mean of the observations. The country weights are given by country  ’s value of real 
GDP relative to the value of real GDP of all 
i
12 N =  EMU countries, 
12
,, 1 it it jt j wY Y
= = ∑ , .  
 
Figure 7: Dispersion of trends and cycles 
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Notes: The lines have been smoothed using a centered three-quarter moving average. 
 
The upper left panel of Figure 7 shows the unweighted and weighted standard deviations of the 
output gaps in the Euro-zone countries. In most periods the weighted measure is lower than the 
  13unweighted. This implies that the degree of business cycle synchronization among the largest 
countries (especially Germany, France and Italy) is higher than between the larger and smaller or 
within the smaller countries. In the seventies and eighties the weighted standard deviations 
fluctuates between 0.5 and 1.5. During the past 15 years we observe a more or less steady 
decline in the dispersion of output gaps in the Euro-zone, for both the weighted and unweighted 
standard deviation. 
 
The upper right panel shows the dispersion of the trend growth rates. In contrast to the output 
gaps, the dispersion of trend grows rates increased remarkably from the beginning of the 
seventies to the end of the nineties. Since 1998 there exists a clear reduction in the dispersion. 
 
The dispersion measures for the cyclical (lower left panel) and the trend component (lower right 
panel) of the inflation rate show a dramatic change over the past 30 years. For both components 
there is a clear and pronounced tendency to a more homogeneous inflation development in the 
Euro-zone countries. This is especially important for the trend inflation rates: After a peak in the 
fist half of the eighties the standard deviation declined steadily from a value of over 5 to less 
than 1. 
 
The figures show that the dispersion of the cyclical components of GDP and inflation is lower 
since the start of the Euro system than it was ever during the past 30 years. There is no sign of a 
cyclical divergence in recent years. The dispersion of the trend growth rate of inflation has now 
the lowest values observed in the past three decades. The dispersion of the trend growth rate of 
GDP is still at relatively high level, but is declining since the start of the euro system. 
 
3  A stress indicator for the euro-zone 
Instead of calculating and interpreting various measures of dispersion for the trend and cycle 
component of real GDP and consumer price inflation, it would be desirable to combine all these 
elements into a single indicator whose evolution over time provides important information 
concerning the adequacy of a single monetary policy for each of the EMU member countries. 
Clarida et al. (1998) were the first to propose a so-called stress indicator, which they used to 
analyze the causes of the 1992/93 crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS). Generally 
  14spoken, stress in a monetary system occurs when for whatever reason a central bank is unable to 
set its policy instrument optimally. 
 
More specifically, stress in country i,  , is defined as the gap between the current nominal 
interest rate in country i,  , and the interest rate that would prevail in country i if it was able to 







,, it it it Sii , = − . (7) 
In the case of  , actual monetary policy is too tight, whereas for   monetary policy 
too loose. Of course, a stress indicator only makes sense in a monetary arrangement in which the 
central bank of country i is not able to adjust its policy instrument   autonomously. A 
monetary union, as the EMU, is a prime example for such an arrangement. 
, 0 it S > , 0 it S <
, it i
 
For the construction of a stress indicator for the current EMU we proceed in two steps. In a first 
step (Section 3.1) we estimate a Taylor rule for each country for the period starting in 1982 Q1 
and ending in 1998 Q4.
1 A Taylor rule belongs to the class of simple monetary policy rules that 
provide two types of information to a central bank that aims at stabilizing inflation around a 
target level and output around its trend: 
  ( )
Taylor
,, , ˆˆ , it it i it it ii f y , = +π . (8) 
On the one hand, the Taylor interest rate,  , is pinned down by the neutral interest rate, 
Taylor
, it i , it i , 
which corresponds to the nominal interest rate that would prevail if all prices were flexible. 
Woodford (2003, Chapter 4) refers to this rate as the Wicksellian natural rate of interest. Put 
more practically, the neutral interest rate is equal to the nominal interest rate that would prevail if 
the output gap was closed and inflation was at target. On the other hand, the Taylor rule 
prescribes the central bank how to adjust its operating target whenever the output gap,  , or the 
inflation gap,  , deviates from zero. Thus, it represents a feedback rule that leads to cyclical 
movements of the nominal interest rate around the neutral interest rate, which are governed by 
, ˆit y
, ˆ it π
                                                 
1 As Greece only entered the EMU in January 2002, the Greek Taylor rule was estimated over the period 1982 Q1 – 
2001 Q4. 
  15the feedback term  ( ) ,, ˆˆ , ii ti t fyπ . Here we assume that the estimated Taylor rules correspond to an 
optimal simple rule, i.e.  , that is followed by each central bank in the pre-EMU period. 
Thus, the feedback coefficients to deviations of inflation from target and output from trend not 
only contain the structural parameters of each country, but also the preferences of each central 
bank towards inflation and output stabilization (Woodford, 2003, Chapter 7). 
Taylor *
, it it i = , i
 
In a second step (Section 3.2) we calculate the stress indicator for each country and for total 
EMU in the post-1999 period, in which the ECB sets the common interest rate   so that  t i , it t ii =  
for all countries i.
2 The ECB also implements its monetary policy according to a policy rule, 
which ideally represents a weighted average of national preferences and national structural 
parameters. But since we are interested in the adequacy of the common monetary policy for 
national stabilization purposes, this rule needs not to be estimated. The stress indicator rather 
compares the common monetary policy with the monetary policy that would be implemented, if 
each country still was able to set interest rates autonomously according to the country-specific 
optimal rule, which we estimated for the 1982-1998 period. Of course, the countries have never 
been subject to a fully autonomous monetary policy in that period as most of them followed 
some kind of exchange rate target against the German mark. But the possibility to readjust the 
par-value in the EMS as well as the existence of capital controls provided each central bank with 
some leeway to pursue domestic policy objectives. Note that a basic assumption underlying this 
procedure is that both the structural parameters and the preferences did not change following the 
implementation of the common central bank. While this assumption should be uncontroversial 
with respect to structural parameters, the unchanged preferences could be questioned against the 
background of the delegation of monetary policy decision-making to a new and independent 
supranational institution that has been agreed upon by all participating countries by signing the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
 
                                                 
2 For Greece stress was calculated from 2002 Q1 on (see footnote 1). 
  163.1  Taylor rule estimation 
For the estimation of the Taylor rule we assume the following empirical specification for the pre-
1999 period, which takes account of interest rate smoothing, i.e. a lagged nominal interest rate as 
additional explanatory variable: 
  () () ,, 1 , 1 , 1 ,, ,, 2 ,, 3 ,, 4 , ˆˆ 1
Y
it i it i it it it i it i it i it it ii g c yx − =β + −β +π + +β π +β +β +ε, . (9) 
The dependent variable,  , is the nominal 3-month inter-bank rate, which is taken from the 
Eurostat database. The country-specific neutral nominal interest rate, 
, it i
, it i , is equal to the sum of 
the trend growth rate of real GDP,  ,
Y
it g  (which is calculated as  ,, 1 , ln ln it it it it YYy y −− −= − , 1 ), the 
trend inflation rate,  , it π , and a time-varying intercept term,  . The cyclical inflation rate and 
the output gap are given by 
, it c
,, ˆ it it it π= π− π ,  and  ,, ˆit it it yyy , = − , respectively. Finally,  , it x  denotes 
the quarter-on-quarter change of the nominal exchange rate against the German mark (an 
increase is a depreciation). Note that all variables are in percent and that  ,  , ˆit y ,
Y
it g ,   and  , ˆ it π , it π  
are the medians computed in Section 2. 
 
This specification deviates from a typical Taylor rule (as for example originally proposed by 
Taylor, 1993) in several aspects. First, the smoothing term is basically included for empirical 
reasons as the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in 
response to news leads to a high autocorrelation in the nominal interest rate. Second, the 
exchange rate term is added in order to account for the countries’ effort to stabilize their 
currencies against the German mark (see Clarida et al., 1998, for a similar approach).  
 
The final aspect, which is the time-varying neutral nominal interest rate, needs some more 
consideration, as our way of dealing with it is a novelty. The great majority of papers estimating 
Taylor rules assume that the neutral nominal interest rate is constant over time. Basically, a 
regression of the following type is run: 
  () ( ) ,, 1 , 1 , 1 , 2 ,, 3 ,, 4 , ˆˆ 1 it i it i i i it i it i it it ii c yx − =β + −β +β π +β +β +ε, , (10) 
where the estimate of   represents the neutral nominal interest rate. Only recently some authors 
applied Kalman filter techniques to account for time variability of the intercept (see for example 
i c
  17Boivin, 2005, and Leigh, 2005). As the implied law of motion of the neutral nominal interest rate 
is an atheoretic random walk, in our paper we go one step further and propose a decomposition 
of the time-variable neutral nominal interest rate that is motivated by theoretical considerations.  
 
The first component is the neutral real interest rate, which is approximated by the trend growth 
rate of real GDP,  ,
Y
it g . With reference to Knut Wicksell’s natural real rate of interest, in New 
Keynesian macroeconomics the neutral real interest rate is defined as the equilibrium real rate of 
return in an economy where prices are fully flexible and where consequently aggregate demand 
equals potential output at all times (see Woodford, 2003, Chapter 4, among others). In such a set-
up intertemporal utility maximization by representative households yields a log-linear 
relationship between the real interest rate and the (expected) growth rate of per capita 
consumption. Under the assumption of a constant capital stock and a constant population the 
growth rate of per capita consumption is equal to the growth rate of potential (or, to be more 
precise, flexible-price) output, which is affected inter alia by the rate of technological progress. If 
the latter is assumed to be the main source of stochastic disturbances, the neutral real interest rate 
should vary over time and it should be positively correlated with the growth rate of potential 
output.  
 
The second component of the neutral nominal interest rate is the trend inflation rate,  , it π , which 
is assumed to reflect the country-specific inflation target. It is clear that this measure only is a 
crude proxy of the countries’ true inflation target, above all in periods when countries followed a 
strict disinflationary policy. This is one of the reasons why we introduced the time-varying 
intercept term   as a third component, which captures those movements of the neutral interest 
rate that are not contained in either the trend growth rate of real GDP or the trend inflation rate.  
, it c
 
For the estimation of the Taylor rule we transform the non-linear regression model (9) into a 
linear estimation equation: 
  () ( ) , , , , ,1 , 1 , , ,2 , ,3 , ,4 , , ˆˆ
YY
it it it it i it it it i it i it i it it ig c i g y x − − −π = +β − −π +β π +β +β +ε   , (11) 
where   and   for  () ,1 1 it it cc =− β  , , () ,, 1 1 ij i ij β=− ββ  2,3,4 j = . Equation (11) is estimated using the 
Kalman filter. The unobserved state variable   is assumed to follow a random walk:  , it c 
  18  ,, 1 it it it cc − , = +ξ  . (12) 
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 1.  ,1 i β  is the smoothing parameter. With the 
exception of Greece the estimated parameters are highly significant and are in the range between 
0.5 and 0.9. The estimated values for  ,2 i β  and  ,3 i β show that central banks reacted positively to 
the cyclical inflation rate and the output gap. The estimated positive values  for  ,4 i β  imply that a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate against the German mark induced a higher short term 
interest rate. 
 
In addition to the basic model (equations (11) and (12)), we estimated a restricted model where 
we set the variance of  , it ξ  a priori to zero, which implies that the parameter   is constant over 
time. The difference between the maximized log likelihood function for the unrestricted and for 
the restricted model is given by dLF. A likelihood ratio test shows that in most cases the 
hypothesis of a constant intercept term can be rejected. 
, it c
 
The time-varying intercept is shown in Figure 8. It is interesting to see that for most of the 
countries a similar picture emerges. In the 1980s the intercept term increased, reached its 
maximum during the 1992/93 EMS crisis, and fell again thereafter. The increase in the intercept 
term can be interpreted as a positive premium that emerges in a fixed rate system when the 
inflation differential to the anchor country is high and when financial markets require a risk 
premium for expected depreciations. Moreover, as most of the countries followed a 
disinflationary policy, which implies a decreasing inflation target over time, the positive 
intercept compensates for the underestimation of the true inflationary gap,  ,, ˆ it it it π= π− π , . The 
fall of the intercept term following the crisis reflects the convergence process in the run-up to 
EMU and the countries’ gain in monetary policy credibility due to their commitment to the EU 
common currency project. Interestingly, there are some countries, in which a negative intercept 
appears prior to EMU entry. These countries share the common feature that trend growth rates of 
real GDP at the end of the 1990s were much higher (more than 4 %, in Ireland even 9 %) than in 
most other countries. Given that short-term nominal interest rates had already converged to low 
German levels as a result of the upcoming EMU entry, the negative intercept term can be 
interpreted an early indicator for stress in these countries as the high trend growth rates would 
require a more restrictive monetary policy stance. 
  19 
Table 1: Taylor rule estimation, 1982 Q1 – 1998 Q4 
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,2 i β   1.02 0.84 1.08 0.89 0.48 0.29 0.79 0.27 1.13 0.22 1.14 0.20 
,3 i β   0.58 1.03 2.22 0.88 0.50 0.30 0.68 1.37 0.64 1.25 0.59 0.23 
,4 i β   4.75 1.17 -0.01 0.22  --  0.08 0.42 0.12 1.23 2.10 0.80 0.13 
























Note: t-values are shown in parentheses; probabilities of the likelihood ratio test (dLF) are shown in brackets. 
 
3.2  Stress indicator 
Country-specific stress is calculated for the post-1999 period by replacing   in equation 
*
, it i (7) 
with the estimated Taylor rule: 
  ( ) ,, , , 2 , ˆˆ
Y
it t i it it i it i it Sic g y =− + + π+ β π+ β , 3 , . (13) 
As we are interested in the deviation of the optimal interest rate for country i from the common 
interest rate  , we ignored the smoothing term and only used the so-called target rate for the 
calculation of the country-specific stress. The target rate indicates the optimal interest rate that 
would be set by the central bank if it were able to instantaneously adjust its policy rate to the 
target rate level. For obvious reasons the exchange rate term was also ignored. 
t i
 
The main problem for the calculation of stress is the intercept term,  , which was allowed to 
vary in the pre-EMU period and for which an assumption has to be made for the EMU period. In 
this context the crucial question is: what would be the premium on the neutral nominal interest 
rate if the countries had not participated at the EMS or if the countries had not decided to join 
EMU? Of course there is no clear answer to this question, so that we have to make an 
assumption. Specifically, we applied two variants for the setting of   in the EMU period. For 




  20intercept term in the 5 years before EMU entry, 
1998 4
,5 , 1994 1 12 0
Q
ii i tQ cc c
= == t ∑  (see Table 2).
3 The 
second variant, which is presented in Appendix 2, simply sets   to zero. The difference between 
both is a constant, which takes the values for each country shown in 
i c
Table 2 and which shifts 
upward (in the case of  ) or downward (in the case of  ,5 0 i c > ,5 0 i c < ) the country-specific stress 
that is computed for  0 i c = . 
 
Table 2: Intercept term   for the EMU period  ,5 i c
  AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE  ITA LUX NET POR SPA 
,5 i c   -0.15 0.16 -0.44 1.65 0.10 2.15 -3.85 2.62 -2.28 -0.83 -0.39 0.40 
 
The results for   are shown in  ,5 ii cc = Figure 9. While in Germany (and to some extent also in 
Austria and Belgium) stress is close to zero in the EMU period, it is generally negative in most 
of the other countries. This implies that above all in Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland (before 2003) 
and France the monetary policy of the ECB is too expansionary if it is evaluated by the 
countries’ pre-EMU central bank policy. In Greece, for example, interest rates would have been 
7 percentage points higher if the Greek central bank still had the means to set policy rates 
autonomously. The picture slightly changes when  0 i c = . The French and the Italian stress 
curves shift upward and are now closer to zero, while negative stress in Ireland, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands is more pronounced. 
 
The fact that stress in Germany is close to zero (the mean over the period 1999 Q1 – 2005 Q4 is 
0.27 percentage points in the case of  ,5 ii cc = ) leads us to conclude that the ECB follows an 
interest rate rule that is similar to the rule implemented by the Bundesbank in the pre-EMU 
period. In other words, the ECB sets policy rates in a way the Bundesbank had also done it, if it 
still were in charge of it. If we now assume that the ECB exactly follows the Bundesbank rule, 
country-specific stress in the remaining countries can be decomposed into a component which is 
due to the neutral interest rate differential (the trend component of stress,  ) and a 
component which is due to the policy feedback to asynchronized movements in the output gap 







                                                 
3 For Greece 
2001 4
,5 , 1997 1 12 0
Q
ii tQ i cc c
= = = ∑ t . 
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which is the weighted average of country-specific stresses, and 
  , (15) 
Instead of analyzing stress in the EMU on a country level, it would be desirable to get an 
aggregate measure of stress for total EMU. For this purpose we propose the following two stress 
indicators:  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ()
,, ,
,, , , , ,
,,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ,,
.
it G E Rt it




iif y f y
SS
≈− =
=− + π − π =
=+
, it S ,, GER t i t
 (14) 
The difference between   and ii −  is due to stress in Germany as the replacement of the 
area-wide interest rate, i , with the German interest rate, i , only holds exactly, if stress in 
Germany is equal to zero:  . 
t , GER t
,, GER t t GER t ii S =−
0 i =
0 i c
The results of the decomposition are shown in Figure 10 (in the case of c ). Except for a few 
periods in Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg, cyclical stress due to differing policy responses to 
asynchronized movements in the output gap and the cyclical inflation rate is limited. Thus, 
cyclical convergence in the euro-zone is high. Negative stress mainly results as a consequence of 
neutral nominal interest rates that are too low compared to the “real” determinants of the 
country-specific neutral nominal interest rate. A further decomposition of the trend component of 
stress shows that negative stress is basically due to trend growth rates of real GDP and consumer 
prices that are much higher in countries like Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain (see Figure 
11). In the case of Luxembourg and Ireland the high trend growth rates are (partially) 
compensated by the negative estimates of the intercept term. This explains why stress increases 
in these countries when, when we set  = . Moreover, Figure 11 also reveals that negative 
stress in France and Italy is mainly caused by the high (positive) estimate of the intercept term 
, which disappears when we set 
 
















=∑ , (16) Figure 8: Estimated time-varying intercept in the pre-EMU period (ci,t) 
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Figure 11: Decomposition of the trend component of stress ( )  ,
trend
it Swhich is the weighted average of absolute values of country-specific stresses. 
 
The levels of the stress indicators provide some important information concerning the evaluation 
of the common monetary policy.   measures the deviation of the actual ECB interest rate 
from the average of the country-specific optimal interest rates. As it closely fluctuates around 
 all over the EMU period (see 
, avg t S
1.8% − Figure 12), the indicator tells us that the ECB policy has 
been too expansionary and that nominal interest rate should have been 1.8 percentage points 
higher in order to match the average of the country-specific optimal interest rates. The value of 
, however, largely depends on the choice of the intercept term  . If we set  ,   
shifts up by around 0.8 percentage points, which reduces the gap between the current ECB 
interest rate and the interest rate that would be optimal, if it were computed according to the pre-
EMU central bank policies.  
, avg t S i c 0 i c = , avg t S
 
Figure 12: Stress indicators 




































 stress ratio  ( c
i = 0 )




, abs t S  is a more comprehensive stress measure as it does not discriminate between negative and 
positive country-specific stresses. In particular, a comparison between   and  , abs t S , avg t S  allows us 
to draw conclusions about the synchronization of the signs of country-specific stresses. For this 
purpose we calculated a so-called stress ratio, ( ) ,, abs t avg t abs t SSS − , , which by construction 
  27varies between zero and one. The lower the stress ratio, the more synchronized country-specific 
signs of stress and the easier it would have been for the ECB to attenuate stress in all countries 
and thereby average stress (as measured by both,   and  ) by adjusting the common 
interest rate into the one or the other direction. During the EMU period the ratio fluctuates 
around 0.15 and is always below 0.5, which is an indicator for the prevalence of equally signed 
(negative) country-specific stresses. Hence, stress could have been reduced by an increase of the 
policy rate. If we set  , the stress ratio increases. This is due to the fact that the source of 
synchronized stress (which below will turn out to be the trend component of stress) becomes less 
important. 
, abs t S , avg t S
0 i c =
 
For the aggregate stress indicators the same decomposition as before can be made. The trend 












n S , (17) 
where  { } , n trend cyclical = . The decomposed stress indicators are shown in Figure 13. The 
upper left panel depicts the weighted averages of the country-specific stress components 
( ), whereas the lower left panel depicts the weighted averages of absolute values of 
country-specific stress components ( ). The right panels show the stress ratios for 
both, the trend component and the cyclical component. 
,, ,
trend cyclical
a v gt a v gt SS
,, ,
trend cyclical
abs t abs t SS
 
Figure 13 shows that the cyclical component of   fluctuates closely around zero. Thus, 
asynchronized cyclical movements in the inflation rate or real GDP are only an unimportant 
source of stress, which is also confirmed by the low value of  . The cyclical component of 
the stress ratio has an interesting pattern. Periods with a high ratio (indicating that there are 
asynchronized country-specific cyclical movements, which cancel out each other) are followed 
by periods with a low ratio (indicating that common shocks hit the EMU, which lead to equally 
signed stress in all countries) and vice versa. A marked example with a ratio close to zero is the 
aftermath of the burst of the New Economy bubble, in which 






avg t S < . Monetary policy of the 
ECB has been overly expansionary in all countries, if it is evaluated by the pre-EMU central 
bank policies.  
  28 
Figure 13: Decomposition of stress indicators 
































































stress ratio (cyclical component)
 
The great part of overall stress is explained by its trend component, as   remains below 
 throughout the EMU period. The fact that the trend component of the stress ratio is zero 
(or close to it) indicates that stress due to the neutral interest differential is equally signed in all 
EMU countries. The value of   suggests that ECB interest rates have been on average 1.9 










0 i c = , the cyclical components of the stress indicators 
remain unaffected. By contrast, the trend components shift by about 0.7 percentage points 
towards the zero line, which basically explains the aforementioned reduction of aggregate stress 
in the case of  .  0 i c =
 
Having stated that there is stress due to diverging trend growth rates of consumer prices and real 
GDP in the EMU and that the level of it depends to a certain extent on the value of the intercept 
term in the Taylor rule, the final question that we have to address is whether or not this stress 
reinforces itself. For this purpose the evolution of the various stress indicators over time provide 
some important information. A look back to Figure 12 shows that even though aggregate stress 
(as measured by  ) is negative all over the EMU period, it remained more or less constant 
and fluctuated around 
, avg t S
1.8% − . Regressing both indicators,   and  , on an intercept term  , avg t S , avg t S
  29and a time trend yields that the coefficient on the latter is only insignificantly different from zero. 
At first sight the picture seems to change when we look at Figure 13. Above all the trend 
component of aggregate stress moves in the direction of the zero line over time. Concluding 
from this observation that stress diminishes, however, is incorrect. To see this it is important to 
recall that the decomposition of stress into a trend and cyclical component was made under the 
assumption that stress in Germany is equal to zero. A look back to Figure 9, however, shows that 
 steadily falls by 1.4 percentage points from  , GER t S 0.9% +  to  0.5% −  over the EMU period. 
Taking into account that the German weight,  , is about  , the increase of   in  , GER t w 30% ,
trend
avg t S
Figure 13 by 0.  percentage points from  4 2.0% −  to  1.6% −  is more or less compensated by the 
decrease in German stress. In sum, there are no signs that stress in the EMU aggravated over 
time. 
 
4  Conclusion 
The aim of the present paper was to analyze whether the Euro-zone diverges. For this purpose 
we developed a stress indicator that combines the trend and the cycle component of real GDP 
and consumer price inflation of all 12 EMU countries in a single measure. The main result of our 
analysis is that stress in the Euro-zone is mainly due to different trend growth rates of GDP and 
consumer prices. For most of the Euro-zone countries interest rates have been too low over the 
1999-2005 period and would, on average, be higher by one or – depending on the construction of 
the stress indicator – two percentage points, if the countries were able to continue following the 
optimal policy rule they adopted in the pre-EMU period. By contrast, cyclical dispersion is rather 
low and the related stress is only minor in relation to the trend component of stress. An important 
finding of the analysis is that stress in Germany is close to zero all over the 1999-2005 period, 
implying that the ECB continues the policy of the German Bundesbank. 
 
The result that stress is negative in most EMU countries, however, does not mean that the Euro-
zone diverges. We rather find that the absolute value of stress remains more or less constant over 
time. Thus, even though the monetary policy of the ECB tends to be too loose for the majority of 
EMU member countries, so far any stress-reinforcing tendencies cannot be identified.  
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